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Abstract

decreased them. In the wake of the September 11th
terror attacks, individuals’ self-reported fear
predicted preferences for “defensive” anti-terror
policies (e.g., deporting suspected terrorists), while
self-reported anger predicted support for “offensive”
policies (e.g., aggressive military action in the
Middle East) [6]. Fear and anger also have distinct
behavioral and psychological correlates outside the
domain of terrorism; perceptions of fearful and angry
faces differentially predict approach and avoidance
behaviors [7], and there is mounting evidence that the
experience of fear and anger are respectively related
to avoidance and approach motivations [8].
Consequently, the public’s experiences of both fear
and anger in the wake of a terror attack likely play
important and distinct roles in determining the
attack’s overall effect on national discussions of
policy.
Of course, all expressions of fear and anger in the
wake of terrorism are not created equal, and given
their relevance to risk judgments and policy
preferences, it is worth understanding how such
emotional reactions are situated within time and
place. Knowing how public fear and anger increase
or decrease over time after an attack can inform
predictions on how public discourse surrounding the
attack will take shape, especially if one emotion
proves to be more temporally stable than the other.
Similarly, understanding how expressions of fear and
anger depend on one’s distance from the attack can
shed light on regional differences in risk perceptions.
Such gradients of fear and anger are especially
important to understand at the national level given
that terror attacks are becoming increasingly local in
nature, with a greater emphasis on small, groundbased, “soft-target” attacks [9]. Such small-scale
attacks may not produce the kinds of far-reaching,
long-lasting emotional responses that characterized
the September 11th attacks, which fueled so much of
the seminal research on public risk perception in the
U.S. Thus, the degree to which one’s expressions of
fear and anger after an attack depends on their
temporal and geographic proximity is an important

Research suggests that public fear and anger in
wake of a terror attack can each uniquely contribute
to policy attitudes and risk-avoidance behaviors.
Given the importance of these negative-valanced
emotions, there is value in studying how terror events
can incite fear and anger at various times and
locations relative to an attack. We analyze 36,259
Twitter posts authored in response to the 2016
Orlando nightclub shooting and examined how fearand anger-related language varied with time and
distance from the attack. Fear-related words sharply
decreased over time, though the trend was strongest
at locations near the attack, while anger-related
words slightly decreased over time and increased
with distance from Orlando. Comparing these results
to users’ pre-attack emotional language suggested
that distant users remained both angry and fearful
after the shooting, while users close to the attack
remained angry but quickly reduced expressions of
fear to pre-attack levels.

1. Introduction
Understanding public reactions to highly salient
terror attacks is crucial to appraising the overall risk
that terrorism poses to society. Terror attacks have
the potential to cause psychological and economic
damage that can far outlast their immediate effects [1,
2, 3, 4], and it is important for researchers and public
officials to anticipate the contours of such effects as
best as possible.
Intuitively, any highly publicized act of terror
should cause heightened levels of negative affect
among the public. Yet one of the clearest and more
nuanced psychological findings regarding terrorism’s
emotional impact is that fear and anger seem to serve
different psychological functions in the aftermath of a
disaster event. One study [5] demonstrated that an
experimental induction of fear increased participants’
terrorism risk perceptions, whereas inducing anger
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empirical question, and one that this study seeks to
address.

1.1 Emotion, Geography, and Time: Existing
Research
Temporal and geographic proximity to terror
attacks have already been studied as meaningful
predictors of public terror reactions. After the
September 11th, 2001 attacks, posttraumatic stress,
driving fatalities (assumed to reflect increased road
traffic due to an aversion to flying), and estimates of
future terrorism risk were greatest among individuals
living close to New York City [10, 11, 12].
Furthermore, recent work [13] has found that social
media expressions of fear and anger in the Paris
metropolitan area sharply increased after a series of
shootings in November of 2015, then sharply
decreased in the days following. Yet it is still unclear
how post-attack expressions of fear and anger vary
over time and geographic proximity in a countrywide sample; [13] limited their analyses to the Paris
metropolitan area (a necessary characteristic of their
method), while other studies [10, 11, 12] focused
mainly on fear- or stress-based reactions. It is not yet
known whether public fear and anger “behave”
similarly or differently in the aftermath of a crisis
when spatial distance from the event is considered, a
finding that could help better clarify the roles that
these emotions play in public disaster response.
We expect that, in the aftermath of a disaster
event (specifically, a terrorist attack for the purposes
of this study), public expressions of both fear and
anger will be strongest in the event’s immediate
aftermath and decrease over time. This expectation
aligns with previous research on emotional
expressions in the aftermath of terror attacks [13],
and intuitively aligns with the notion that one’s
emotional reaction to an event becomes less severe as
the event fades from immediate memory.
We also expect that expressions of fear will be
greatest at locations close to a disaster event of
interest, as suggested by research on regional
variations in fear following the 9/11 attacks. The
relationship between anger and geographic distance,
however, is more theoretically complex. Just as fear
reactions are strongest among individuals who reside
near where a disaster event occurred [10, 11, 12, 14],
the same may be true of anger; the psychological
closeness of the event may simply amplify its
emotional intensity across all negative emotions,
including anger. Furthermore, anger is a moral
emotion that is often brought on by perceptions of
suffering [15], which are likely strongest at locations
close to a disaster event [14]. However, fear and

anger are served by different cognitive appraisals
[16], with fear arising from appraisals of uncertainty
and uncontrollability, and anger arising from
appraisals of certainty and controllability. It may be
that individuals closer to a disaster event experience
heightened levels of fear, but that the cognitive
uncertainty producing such fear inhibits the
expression of anger to the same degree as individuals
who are distant from the attack. Thus, the unclear
relationship between geographic distance and anger
is one of the primary contributions of this work.
Lastly, we investigate whether the hypothesized
decreases in fear and anger over time depend on an
individual’s distance from the attack. To inform this
research question, we again draw on [13] which
showed that decreases in fear and anger over time
were well-modeled by a Weibull survival model.
This finding suggests that fear and anger did not
decrease linearly in the sample, but that the
magnitude of a given day’s decrease was related to
the magnitude of emotional expression on the
previous day. Based on this result, we expect that
locations with the highest levels of expressed fear
and anger will exhibit sharper decreases than
locations with lower levels of emotional expression.
Thus, the effect of time on fear and anger will be
strongest at the geographic distance corresponding to
the highest level of their expression.
1.2 Present Study: Social Media Responses to

the Orlando Nightclub Shooting
To investigate gradients of fear and anger
responses to terrorism at a national level, we focus
our anlaysis on the 2016 shooting at the Pulse
Nightclub in Orlando, Florida. The 2016 Orlando
nightclub shooting was the deadliest mass shooting in
the United States at the time of its occurrence, and is
prototypical of the kinds of soft-target terror attacks
that have come to dominate the terrorism landscape
in recent years [9, 17], making it a useful case study
on post-terror attack discourse across the United
States. Note that we classify the Orlando shooting as
a terror attack for the purposes of this study given
that the shooter had personally pledged allegiance to
the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria before carrying out
the assault.
To assess individual reactions to the attack in a
naturalistic setting, we focus on the social media
response following the shooting. In the aftermath of
highly-publicized crisis events, social media can
serve as a platform for collective information sharing
[18, 19], partly because the desire to obtain current
information is a strong motivation for social media
use [19]. Social media has even been shown to serve
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different functions for those at varying distances from
a mass emergency, with users immediately affected
by an event more likely to share locally-relevant
information and those further away more likely to
engage in generic commentary [20].
Of course, behavior on social media platforms is
driven by a host of factors that can skew the quality
of the information shared, such as users’ reputations
[19]. Still, social media has served as a useful data
source in other investigations of public terror
reactions [13, 14], and it carries the benefit of
allowing for unobtrusive measurement of individuals’
expressed thoughts and opinions. Thus, we argue that
it still holds relevance for theoretically-motivated
questions if interpreted with caution.
1.3 Variables of Interest and Hypotheses
Our outcome variables of interest are the use of
fearful and angry language in Twitter posts
discussing the 2016 Orlando nightclub shooting, with
each user’s geographic proximity to the shooting’s
location and the elapsed time between the attack and
authorship of their Twitter post as the primary
predictor variables. Regarding social media
expressions of fear in the aftermath of the attack, we
hypothesize the following:
1) Use of fear-related language will negatively
correlate with the elapsed time between the
attack and each Twitter post (i.e., decreases over
time, as suggested by [13]).
2) Use of fear-related language will negatively
correlate with users’ distance from the shooting’s
location in Orlando, FL (as suggested by
research on regional variations in reactions to
9/11).
3) Distance will moderate the effect of time on fearrelated language, such that the (hypothesized)
decrease in fear over time will be strongest at
locations closer to the attack.
Regarding social media expressions of anger, we
hypothesize the following:
1) Use of anger-related language will negatively
correlate with the elapsed time between the
attack and each Twitter post (i.e., decreases over
time, as suggested by [13]).
2) Use of anger-related language will depend on
geographic distance from Orlando, FL, though
we do not hypothesize the direction of this effect
(given the potential theoretical justifications for
both directions).
3) Distance will moderate the effect of time on
anger-related
language,
such
that
the
(hypothesized) decrease in anger over time will

be strongest at whichever distance is related to
higher initial levels of anger.

2. Method
2.1 Sample
We obtained a sample of Twitter posts made
between June 11, 2016 and June 19, 2016 (the week
following the Orlando nightclub shooting) that
included one or more of the hashtags
“#OrlandoShooting”,
“#Orlando”,
or
“#pulseshooting” (an initial web search suggested
that these were the most common hashtags used on
social media to refer to the event). The initial dataset
yielded over 4 million posts, from which we excluded
all retweets (posts written by one user and re-posted
by another) and posts that only contained hashtags or
web address links.
Posts had to be in English (see automatic
language detection function in R package “cld2”;
[21]), authored by non-verified Twitter accounts
(where verified refers to official accounts for
organizations or celebrities), and posted by users in
the United States for whom location data (at the city
level) was available. Where there were multiple posts
written by the same user, we include only their
earliest post, and we eliminated all posts from before
the onset of the shooting (defined as 2:06 a.m.
Eastern Time, June 12, 2016 [22]). Further inspection
of the data revealed some tweets posted by news sites
(rather than individuals) that were not screened out
with the original criteria, which were subsequently
removed. Filtering the dataset by these criteria
yielded a final sample of 36,259 posts. Note that a
sample of this size would allow us to detect bivariate
correlations of 0.019 with 95% power, and while our
analyses do not primarily rely on null hypothesis
significance testing or bivariate correlations, this
serves as an example of the sufficiency of our sample
size for our research purposes.

2.2 Procedure
2.2.1. Text preprocessing. We implemented
multiple cleaning steps to convert each Twitter post
into an analyzable text object for further analysis.
Each post was stripped of all non-punctuation/nonalphanumeric characters (which removes special
characters such as Emojis), as well as all links to
other content (such as webpages or pictures).
Because some users often use hashtags as parts of
their post’s syntax (e.g., “Our thoughts are with the
#pulseshooting victims”), we chose to retain all
hashtags that were directly followed by non-hashtag
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words while removing all others. Thus, hashtags
embedded in the middle of sentences are assumed to
serve some grammatical function and are kept as part
of the post’s content, while those that appear at the
end (where users often place multiple hashtags in a
row) are removed. For example, the tweet “Our
thoughts are with the #pulseshooting victims
#Orlando #OrlandoShooting” would be shortened to
“Our thoughts are with the pulseshooting victims.”
While these procedures cannot guarantee that each
post will perfectly reflect the semantic content
intended by the author, it reduces much of the noise
introduced by social media conventions.
2.2.2. Time and distance from attack. For each
post, temporal distance from the Orlando attack was
measured as the number of days (including partial
days) between 2:06 a.m. ET on June 12, 2016 (the
time at which police were notified of the Orlando
shooting; [17]) and the date/time at which the post
was created.
Geographic proximity was measured as the
number of miles between the latitude and longitude
coordinates of the Pulse nightclub and the central
latitude/longitude coordinates of each user’s nearest
ZIP code, which was retrieved through the Bing
Maps Application Programming Interface (API).
Because not all users choose to report their city of
residence in their profile (or might simply include
broader location information, such as state or
country), location data was only retained for users in
the United States where the API could identify a
single location profile at the city level. We identified
the closest U.S. ZIP code to each city center, and
calculated the distance between this ZIP code and the
Pulse Nightclub using the “Imap” R package [23] and
ZIP code location data from the United States Census
Bureau [24]. Note that distance was measured “as the
crow flies,” rather than based on driving distance,
which was necessary given that some users resided in
Hawaii.
2.2.3. Covariates. One of the challenges of
measuring the effect of geographic proximity on
emotional expression is its confounds with other
potentially relevant variables. Thus, we also account
for the following covariates in our analysis:
It is possible that individual reactions to terror
attacks depend partly on one’s residence in an urban
or rural area (given that many high-profile terror
attacks target dense, urban locations), and we thus
control for population density (given that some of the
least densely populated areas of the United States are
in western states and Alaska, relatively distant from
Orlando). As aforementioned, we employed the Bing

Maps API to match each user’s self-described
location with a U.S. city; those that could be correctly
matched were cross-referenced with data from the
2010 Census [25] to produce city-level population
density for each user.
Note that we conduct all analysis with the
logarithm of population density; this transformation
reduced substantial positive skewness, and reflects
the theoretical assumption that differences in
population density on the lower end (distinguishing
urban from rural areas) likely matter more than
similar-sized variations at the high end
(distinguishing urban areas of different density). As
an example, using raw population densities for
Galena, AK (a small town with population 5,700),
Dallas, TX, and New York, NY leads to a difference
in “urban-ness” between Dallas and New York (both
major cities) that is roughly 7.5 times the difference
in “urban-ness” between Dallas and Galena (one of
which is considered a large city, the other a small
town). Meanwhile, employing log-scaled population
density sets these differences as approximately equal,
which seemed to better represent the distinction
between urban and rural areas.
Many of the lowest-earning states in the U.S. are
in or near the American South, according to recent
census data (e.g., Mississippi, West Virginia,
Arkansas, Alabama, Kentucky), whereas some of the
highest earning states are in the northeast (New
Jersey, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire)
or even outside the continental U.S. (Alaska,
Hawaii). To ensure that any effect of geographic
distance was unrelated to any regional disparities in
wealth, we estimated users’ income based on the
Twitter accounts they followed. This method comes
from [26], which identified the Twitter accounts that
best predicted the annual income of the users that
followed them. We apply the regression model from
their study to each of our user’s friends list to
estimate which of four income categories ($0$50,000; $50,000-$100,000; $100,000-$150,000;
$150,000+) the user most likely belongs to, and
defined their estimated income as the lower bound of
their most likely income bracket. See [26] for a list of
the Twitter accounts used to estimate income, along
with their respective regression weights. Users’
scores for each income bracket were calculated as the
sum of the weights for the accounts they followed
that corresponded to that income bracket, and they
were assigned to the income bracket for which they
had the highest score.
Lastly, we sought to ensure that any effects of
geographic distance were not confounded with any
regional differences in political orientation. While
political orientation is not directly available from
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Twitter profiles, we employ a method introduced by
[27] to estimate the political sentiments of each user.
In this procedure, [27] estimated the average political
ideology of the users who followed various Twitter
news accounts (e.g., @foxnews, @latimes), based on
the Congress members that their audiences also
followed. We use these ideology estimates for 20
news accounts to estimate each participants’ political
orientation as the average ideology score of the news
accounts they follow; see [27] for a list of the news
accounts used for this calculation.
2.2.4. Anger- and fear-related language. Anger and
fear expressions in each post were defined as the
number of words from the anxiety and anger
dictionaries from Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count
[28], a widely-used and well-validated collections of
terms representing psychological constructs that has
previously been used in social media analyses of
public terrorism response [13]. The anxiety
dictionary contains terms such as scared, vulnerable,
stunned, and uneasy, while the anger dictionary
contains terms such as angry, evil, mad, and hate. We
specifically removed the term terror* from the
anxiety dictionary (as users who referenced terrorism
may not necessarily be expressing fear), and removed
the terms kill and victim from the anger dictionary, as
users employing these terms may have simply been
describing the attack.

2.3 Analysis
We rely on Bayesian Poisson regression to test for
relationships between each of our psychological
distance predictors and our word-count variables of
interest (fear expressions, anger expressions, and
concrete term use), and communicate all regression
effects using 95% Highest Posterior Density (HPD)
intervals (i.e., the shortest interval containing 95% of
the parameter’s posterior density). Poisson regression
is a method for analyzing count data when the
variance is approximately equal to the mean, which
was true for word counts of fear ( =0.068, s2=0.072)
and anger ( =0.388, s2=0.401), and both word count
variables were well-approximated by Poisson
distributions. Note that, because we use raw word
counts rather than term frequencies (i.e., raw word
counts divided by the text’s length), we include
Tweet word count as a covariate in all analyses, such
that all reported effects are independent of the length
of each Twitter post.
Given that estimating users’ income and political
orientation required that they follow certain accounts
(and also required that their list of followed accounts
was made publicly available), only n=16,492 users

had non-missing estimates for political orientation
and income. Thus, in all models, we first test for the
effect of temporal and geographic distance on each
user’s fear and anger term counts, then confirm that
such effects remain reliable when including
population density (in the full sample) and income
and political orientation (in the n=16,492 subsample
of users with non-missing data). Note that fear and
anger term counts did not appreciably differ between
the subsamples of users with and without missing
political orientation and income estimates
(
<0.05).

3. Results
3.1 Descriptive statistics
Figure 1 presents kernel density plots for each
predictor, and shows how most variables exhibited at
least some degree of skew, with some bimodality
present in the population density variable (largely due
to the high calculated population density of New
York City, which comprises the righthand mode of
the distribution). As aforementioned, we conduct all
analyses using the logarithm of population density
rather than its raw value (also presented in Figure 1).
Time and geographic proximity were virtually
uncorrelated with each other (Spearman’s ρ=-0.019),
as was geographic proximity with income estimates
(ρ=-0.059) and political orientation (ρ=-0.050).
Distance and population density were correlated at
ρ=0.262, suggesting that users who lived further from
Orlando tended to occupy more densely populated
areas. Lastly, counts of fear- and anger-related terms
were relatively uncorrelated (ρ=0.025).
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estimated in the n=16,492 subset without covariates
included (
=0.842;
=0.977;
=1.051),
suggesting that the inclusion of income, political
orientation, and population density did not attenuate
the effects of time and proximity on expressions of
fear. While not relevant to our hypotheses, note that
political orientation (but not income) was reliably
predictive of fear-related language (eb=1.010, 95%
HPD=1.001, 1.018), with a one SD change towards
more liberal political orientation predicting a 7.5%
increase in fear-related term use.
Figure 2 shows the gradient of predicted fear term
use at different values of time and geographic
distance. Note that the effect of time is strongly
negative at close distances, but attenuates towards
zero at more distant locations. Interestingly, the effect
of distance is almost nonexistent at the time of the
attack’s occurrence, but becomes increasingly
positive (with greater geographic distance predicting
more expressions of fear) as time passes.

Figure 1. Density plots for predictors and
covariates

3.2 Predicting Expressions of Fear
Expressions of fear on Twitter decreased as a
function of time since the attack (eb=0.816, 95%
HPD=0.770, 0.862); interpreting the exponentiated
regression coefficient suggests that each passing day
corresponded to an 18.4% decrease in the prevalence
of fear-related terms. There was no reliable main
effect of geographic distance (eb=0.969, 95%
HPD=0.892, 1.053), though time and distance did
interact in predicting fear-related language (eb=1.061,
95% HPD=1.021, 1.102), with the effect of time on
fear-related term use decreasing as distance from the
attack increased. Each passing day corresponded to
an 18.4% decrease in term use at 0 miles from the
attack, a 13.4% decrease at 1000 miles from the
attack, an 8.2% decrease at 200 miles from the attack,
and a 2.6% decrease at 3000 miles from the attack.
Note that the magnitudes of these effects were
unchanged when including population density in the
model (
=0.815;
=0.962;
=1.061).
Effect sizes changed slightly when including income
and political orientation (for the n=16,492 subset
with non-missing values;
=0.846;
=0.979;
=1.050), though were comparable to the effects

Figure 2. Gradient for predicted fear terms

3.3 Predicting Expressions of Anger
Anger-related terms also reliably decreased over
time (eb=0.961, HPD=0.942, 0.979), though to a
lesser degree than fear-related language, with the
average number of anger terms decreasing by 3.9%
with each passing day. Unlike with fear, the main
effect of distance was reliable (eb=1.061,
HPD=1.025, 1.095) and suggested that the average
number of anger-related words increased by 6.1% for
each 1000 miles of distance from Orlando. However,
the use of anger-related language did not depend on
an interaction between time and geographic distance
(eb=1.005, HPD=0.991, 1.019). These effects did not
appreciably change when including population
density (
=0.961;
=1.059;
=1.004) or
income and population density (n=16,492 subsample;
=0.965;
=1.045;
=1.005). Note that
estimates of political orientation (but not income)
were slightly predictive of anger-related language
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(eb=0.992, 95% HPD=0.989, 0.996), with a one SD
change towards more liberal political orientation
predicting a 5.4% decrease in anger-related term use.
Figure 3 shows the gradient of predicted angerrelated term use at various times and distances from
the attack. Note that the gradient is generally flatter
than that of fear, largely reflecting the smaller role of
time in predicting anger.

Figure 3. Gradient for predicted anger terms

3.4 Base Rates of Fear and Anger
To better contextualize the degrees of fear and
anger expressed in each user’s post, we collected up
to 200 of each user’s most recent posts made before
the Orlando shooting, data which was publicly
available for n=21,811 users, and identified the
average number of fear- and anger-related terms that
appeared in each post prior to the Orlando attack
(note that this subsample did not severely differ from
the other users in terms of fear or anger expressions
in their posts;
<0.05). On average, we collected
163 posts per user, which contained an average of
0.027 fear-related words per post (compared to 0.068
across the Orlando-focused tweets) and 0.060 angerrelated words per post (compared to 0.388 across the
Orlando-focused tweets).
Taking these values as base rate estimates of fear
and anger term usage suggests that expressions of
fear and anger were understandably more prevalent in
our sample of Tweets than would be expected during
“normal” Twitter activity by the same group of users,
with the pre/post-attack change in anger language (a
547% increase) more pronounced than for fear (a
153% increase). Furthermore, examining these base
rates in relation to the prediction gradients in Figures
2 and 3 suggests that anger-related language
remained heightened through the week for users at all
locations. Fear-related language remained heightened
only for users distant from Orlando; those who lived
near Orlando were predicted to return to pre-attack
levels of fear language by roughly the fifth day after
the attack.

4. Discussion
The data partially supported our hypotheses
regarding the effects of time and geographic distance
on social media sentiment following the Orlando
nightclub shooting. As hypothesized, both angerrelated and fear-related language in Tweets
discussing the attack decreased over time, though
expressions of fear decayed much more quickly than
expressions of anger. As hypothesized, time and
distance interacted in the model predicting fear (but
not anger), suggesting that the time decay of fearrelated language was most pronounced at locations
closest to the Orlando shooting; however, this
interaction seemed to increase, rather than decrease,
the magnitude of the distance-fear association over
time, given distance’s null effect in the attack’s
immediate aftermath. Regional differences in anger
were not as pronounced, but our model suggested that
anger-related language was most common at distant,
rather than proximal, locations (though distance and
time did not interact in their effects on anger
expressions, as hypothesized). Note that all estimated
effects controlled for any potential influence of
population density, estimated political orientation,
and estimated user income.
Taken together, these results confirm past findings
on the decline in negative sentiment in the days
following terror attacks [13], while also suggesting
potentially important differences in the public’s
experience of the two emotions. Future studies
should attempt to replicate our finding that linguistic
markers of anger were more temporally stable than
fear (and were less likely to return to pre-attack
levels), as any real difference in the public’s tendency
to “hold on” to one emotion over the other could
have important implications for public discourse
about terrorism. In general, spatial variation in both
emotions suggests that users far from the attack
remained relatively fearful and angry about the attack
in the week following it, whereas users closer to the
attack seemed to remain angry while reducing their
expressions of fear to pre-attack levels relatively
quickly. One possible explanation is that anger was
related to users’ frustrations about societal or policy
issues (e.g., recurrence of mass shootings, feelings
towards terrorism, gun control laws, etc.) and was
thus relatively stable across time and space. Yet as
time passed, users close to the attack may have
transitioned from expressing fear to expressing other
emotions such as sympathy or solidarity (which have
been shown to increase with geographic proximity to
an event [13]), while distant users may have felt these
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emotions to a lesser degree and remained generally
fearful about the prospect of a future attack.
Perhaps one of the most applicable conclusions to
be drawn here is the value of studying public anger
following a highly publicized act of terror. Many
studies on public terror reactions focus primarily on
fear [29, 30, 31] or fear-related constructs, such as
perceptions of risk. Yet while a handful of studies
have acknowledged the diverging effects of fear and
anger on relevant constructs such as policy attitudes,
anger is still far from the focus of attention as a
dependent measure in terrorism research. Our results
suggest that anger, compared to fear, 1) increased
more sharply in response to the Orlando shooting, 2)
remained at elevated levels for longer, and 3)
exhibited fewer regional variations (whereas fear
decayed at different rates at different distances from
Orlando), suggesting its potential usefulness as a
central variable of interest in research on the public’s
response to terror. Furthermore, given that emotions
can exhibit a contagion effect on social media [32,
33], the relative temporal and geographic stability of
anger may suggest a particularly strong ability for it
to propagate through social networks (compared to
fear, which exhibited more regional variation and
diminished more quickly over time), though this
assertion should be tested in future research. If this is
truly the case, then specifically monitoring angry
social media posts in an event’s aftermath can help
officials better predict which sentiments and ideas
may propagate to others and remain in circulation the
longest.
There are, of course, many limitations of any
psychological investigation involving social media.
Participants were inherently selected by outcome,
since they were only included if they had a Twitter
account and specifically chose to respond to the
Orlando attack. Many potential covariates of interest
(e.g., gender and other demographic characteristics)
were unable to be studied due to the difficult nature
of ascertaining individual-level data from social
media. Thus, our inclusion of income, population
density, and political orientation merely represents an
attempt to estimate variables that might have been
correlated with physical distance, rather than an
exhaustive set of relevant individual difference
variables. Another limitation of text-analytic studies
is small effect sizes, given the noise inherent to
studies of natural language, and it is important to
emphasize that such effects are much more valuable
from a theory-building standpoint than a predictive
standpoint. As aforementioned, sentiment expressed
on social media should not necessarily be taken as an
unbiased measure of an individual’s true emotional
experience, given the many motivations that can

drive individual social media behavior (desire to
impress followers, conformity to the behavior of
one’s social network, etc.). Furthermore, we selected
an event that victimized a specific minority
community (LGBTQ+), and levels of fear and anger
may have been affected by this unique characteristic
of the attack (e.g., more emotional intensity from
users that identify with the LGBTQ+ community).
Still, this data’s value lies in its ability to convey
contemporaneous reactions to a highly publicized
terror attack across a wide geographic area, while
allowing us to compare individuals’ emotional
expressions to baseline activity and control for
potential confounds (income, urban vs. rural
residence, political orientation). Furthermore, as
other researchers have pointed out [34], social media
studies are valuable in their ability to generate datadriven hypotheses for future study in more controlled
settings. Our results have suggested that anger may
be a more predictable and stable emotional response
to terror attacks than fear, a contrast that this study’s
focus on temporal and geographic distance is in a
unique position to draw.
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